When one region of the world economy experiences a …nancial crisis, the world-wide availability of investment opportunities declines. As global investors search for new destinations for their capital, other regions will experience in ‡ows of hot money. However, large capital in ‡ows make the recipient countries more vulnerable to future adverse shocks, creating the risk of serial …nancial crises. This paper develops a formal model of such ‡ows of hot money and the vulnerability to serial …nancial crises. We analyze the role for macro-prudential policies to lean against the wind of such capital ‡ows so as to o¤set the externalities that occur during …nancial crises. Summarizing the results of our model in a simple policy rule, we …nd that a 1 percentage point increase in a country's capital in- ‡ows/GDP ratio warrants a 0.87 percentage point increase in the optimal level of capital in ‡ow taxation.
Introduction
In recent decades, the world economy has experienced serial …nancial crises that seemed to be linked by a recurrent pattern: one country or sector in the world economy experiences a …nancial crisis; capital ‡ows out in a panic; investors seek a more attractive destination for their money. In the next destination, capital in ‡ows create a boom that is accompanied by rising indebtedness, rising This paper was prepared for the IMF's Eleventh Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference and the IMF Economic Review. I would like to thank the editors Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas and Ayhan Kose for very thoughtful comments on earlier versions of the paper. Rudolfs Bems, Julien Bengui, Gianluca Benigno, Javier Bianchi, Carmen Reinhart and Carlos Végh as well as two anonymous referees have kindly provided a number of helpful comments and suggestions. I am grateful to Rocio Gondo Mori and Elif Ture for excellent research assistance. asset prices and booming consumption -for a time. But all too often, these capital in ‡ows are followed by another crisis. Some commentators describe these patterns of capital ‡ows as "hot money" that ‡ows from one sector or country to the next and leaves behind a trail of destruction.
The goal of this paper is to develop a model that captures these phenomena and that analyzes optimal policy responses. In the model, there are multiple borrowing countries that access …nance from a group of international investors. Financial relationships are subject to collateral constraints that depend on the value of the asset holdings of borrowers. When a given borrowing country experiences an adverse shock, its …nancial constraints become binding and borrowers need to cut back on consumption, which leads to …nancial ampli…cation e¤ects, i.e. an episode of falling asset prices, tightening borrowing constraints and further declining consumption. However, if there is less loan demand, lenders face a shortage of investment opportunities and bid the interest rate below its steady state level. This in turn increases the incentives for other, unconstrained countries to raise their debt burden and expose themselves to greater risk of future …nancial constraints. This is the sense in which money becomes "hot" -each time one borrower faces a crisis, money ‡ows to the next and increases that borrower's …nancial fragility, making them vulnerable to "serial …nancial crises."
It is well-known that individual countries that are prone to …nancial am-pli…cation e¤ects borrow excessively because borrowers do not internalize that their actions increase aggregate …nancial instability (see e.g. Jeanne and Korinek, 2010) . This paper adds a general equilibrium analysis and investigates the externalities of …nancial crises across countries. We …nd that excessive borrowing in a given country is particularly prevalent when other countries in the world economy have just experienced a …nancial crisis so that interest rates are low and the remaining countries experience in ‡ows of "hot money."Under such circumstances, we …nd that macro-prudential policy measures are especially important.
Speci…cally, our numerical analysis shows that an adverse shock of a given size that normally leads to a 12% decline in domestic absorption will cause a 14.6% decline in domestic absorption if a country has just experienced in ‡ows of hot money. By imposing a macroprudential tax on capital in ‡ows of close to 2%, these magnitudes can be reduced to 8.8% and 10% respectively. This magnitude of in ‡ow taxation is within the range of policy measures that have recently been enacted by a number of emerging economies. Summarizing the optimal response of macroprudential taxation to ‡ows of hot money in a simple linear policy rule, we …nd that a 1 percentage point increase in a country's capital in ‡ows/GDP ratio in our model warrants a 0.87 percentage point increase in the optimal level of capital in ‡ow taxation.
Empirical Motivation
In the following, we document the empirical relationships between movements in world interest rates, capital ‡ows, and the risk of …nancial crises. Notes: This …gure depicts the correlation between world interest rates, as captured by the real yield of ten year US Treasury securities, and the fraction of countries in the world economy that experienced capital ‡ow bonanzas as de…ned by Reinhart and Reinhart (2008) . Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between world interest rates and the incidence of capital ‡ow bonanzas over the past quarter decade, i.e. the period when most developed countries had abolished their controls on international capital ‡ows. World interest rates are captured by the yield of ten year US Treasury securities de ‡ated by the three-year moving average of US consumer price in ‡ation. The indicator for capital ‡ows re ‡ects the fraction of countries in the world economy which experienced a capital ‡ow bonanza as de…ned by Reinhart and Reinhart (2008) , i.e. a current account in the lowest quintile of realizations.
It can be seen that declining interest rates were generally associated with an increase in the incidence of such bonanzas, most notably in the aftermath of the recession of 1990/91 and in the aftermath of the dot.com bust and the ensuing recession of 2001. The correlation between the two variables is a statistically signi…cant -0.69. On the left side of table 1, we report the results of a Granger causality test between low US interest rates and capital in ‡ow bonanzas in a panel of 176 countries. (Details on the data sources and estimation strategy are provided in appendix A.) It can be seen that lagged US real interest rates signi…cantly Granger-cause capital in ‡ow bonanzas to countries around the world. 1 Reinhart and Reinhart (2008) emphasize that such bonanzas are strongly associated with booms in asset prices, real estate prices and exchange rates. bonanza t crisis t bonanza t 1 .380*** crisis t 1 .043** (26.2) (3.0) US10y t 1 -.016*** bonanza t 1 .035*** (-5.17) (3.5) c
.152*** c .071*** (12.9) (16.5) Figure 2 illustrates the link from capital ‡ows to crises. We report the percentage of countries that experience capital ‡ow bonanzas as in the previous …gure but lag it by two years. The second line captures the fraction of countries in the world economy that experienced a banking crisis, as de…ned by Reinhart and Reinhart (2008) . The two indicators are signi…cantly positively correlated until 2001, with a coe¢ cient of correlation of 0.53. After this period, a "superbonanza" takes o¤ in which the lag between capital ‡ow bonanzas and crises seems to have lengthened -but the large bonanzas between 2001 and 2007 have certainly played an instrumental role in the ensuing global …nancial crisis of 2008.
The next …gure 3 depicts the probability of a country su¤ering a crisis conditional on having experienced a capital in ‡ow bonanza t years ago. The dashed lines represent a 95% con…dence interval. For comparison, the horizontal line illustrates the unconditional probability of a country in the sample to experience a crisis, which is 5.8%. It can be seen that if a country experiences a capital in ‡ow bonanza, the probability that it su¤ers a crisis in the ensuing years is signi…cantly elevated, with a maximum of 8.3% two years after the bonanza took place.
On the right side of 
Literature
Our paper is related to the positive literature on …nancial ampli…cation, such as Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) , who have studied the positive aspects of …nancial ampli…cation in a single sector. Mendoza (2001 Mendoza ( , 2010 and Aoki, Benigno and Kiyotaki (2008) apply this analysis to the case of a small open economy. By contrast, we develop a multi-country model in which di¤erent countries may su¤er from …nancial ampli…cation and crisis at di¤erent times, allowing us to study the spillover e¤ects of such episodes of …nancial ampli…cation among countries. Devereux and Yetman (2010) and Nguyen (2010) also develop multi-country models of …nancial ampli…cation, but they do so in a framework in which …nancial constraints are always binding so ampli…cation e¤ects always at work. In our setup, …nancial ampli…cation occurs infrequently -it arises endogenously when an economy is hit by an adverse shock of su¢ cient magnitude. This allows us to study what macroprudential measures a country can take in normal times when …nancial constraints are loose as a precaution against future binding constraints.
Our paper is also related to Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2008) who describe "moving bubbles" as instances in which one sector in the world economy becomes …nancially more constrained and capital moves on to other less constrained sectors. In our work, binding …nancial constraints in one part of the world economy also lead to higher capital ‡ows to other parts. However, we focus on how such ‡ows make the recipient countries more vulnerable to …nancial crises in subsequent periods. Martin and Ventura (2010) examine rational bubbles in an environment with …nancial ampli…cation e¤ects.
Our paper also investigates the normative aspects of multi-country …nancial ampli…cation dynamics. This is related to a growing literature on …nancial am-pli…cation and externalities, as studied e.g. by Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2003) , Korinek (2007 Korinek ( , 2009 Korinek ( , 2010 Korinek ( , 2011b , Lorenzoni (2008) , Korinek (2010, 2011ab) and Bianchi (2011) . The insight in these papers is that decentralized agents do not internalize that their privately optimal …nancing decisions make the economy in aggregate more vulnerable to episodes of …nancial ampli…cation. For example, borrowers take on an excessive amount of …nance, creating a role for macroprudential regulation. While the existing literature has studied such regulation exclusively from a single-country perspective, the contribution of this paper is to develop a general equilibrium model of the world economy in order to study the optimal response of macroprudential measures to events external to a given country. We show that external factors such as crises in other parts of the world economy lead to increased capital ‡ows ("hot money"). This magni…es the incentives for borrowers to take on larger debts and larger exposure to …nancial fragility, leading to higher externalities and, in turn, a greater need for macroprudential regulation. In addition, our paper sheds light on the general equilibrium e¤ects that arise when multiple countries in the world economy impose macroprudential regulations. Tobin (1978) argues that real factors such as labor and capital adjust more slowly than prices in international …nancial markets, and that untamed movements in international …nancial markets may therefore have painful real consequences. He famously concludes that it may be desirable "to throw some sand in the wheels of our excessively e¢ cient international money markets." Tobin's argument is based on broad but unspeci…c concerns about the undesirability of sharp movements in …nancial markets, but he does not provide a welfare analysis of why such movements may be socially ine¢ cient and merit policy intervention. By contrast, our paper analyzes a speci…c externality that arises when economies experience binding …nancial constraints and are subject to …nancial ampli…cation e¤ects. This provides a clear welfare rationale for capital controls.
Tobin proposes a general tax on all foreign exchange transactions in order to avoid sharp exchange rate movements. We instead propose a tax on debt in- ‡ows, since we view the buildup of leverage as the main factor that creates the risk of sharp …nancial adjustments.
Although this paper focuses exclusively on ex-ante measures to deal with …nancial crises, Benigno et al. (2010) and Jeanne and Korinek (2011b) also study the role of ex-post stimulus interventions to address …nancial crises. The general result in these papers is that policymakers would always want to engage in a mix of ex-ante prudential and ex-post stimulus measures when faced with the risk of …nancial crises that involve …nancial ampli…cation.
The sectoral structure of our model is related to Korinek, Roitman and Végh (2010) who capture the phenomenon of "decoupling" and "recoupling" during the 2008/09 …nancial crisis. They describe decoupling as a situation when one part of the world economy is …nancially constrained and can no longer demand capital or other factors, which lowers world factor prices and bene…ts the remaining unconstrained sectors. The same role is played by "hot money" in this paper: …nancial crisis and …nancial constraints in one country lead to capital ‡ows to other countries, which bene…ts them by lowering the interest rates at which they borrow. However, this paper adds an important dimension to the debate by showing that the capital ‡ows that accompany an episode of decoupling are a mixed blessing: they not only provide a bene…t to the recipient countries by lowering their cost of borrowing, but they also lead to greater future …nancial instability. Decoupling therefore strengthens the case for macroprudential policy action.
Model Setup
We describe a model of the world economy in in…nite discrete time t = 0; 1; ::: The world economy consists of two types of agents: (i) international investors who represent "hot money" and who hold savings that they move where return opportunities are greatest; (ii) di¤erent countries who borrow and who are subject to an endogenous collateral constraint. We describe each in detail.
International Investors
We assume that international investors come in overlapping generations: 3 each period, a continuum of mass one of investors are born who live for two periods. We denote the variables of investors with the superscript h (as in "hot money"or "households"). Investors value consumption according to a neoclassical period utility function v (c) that satis…es v 0 (c) > 0 > v 00 (c), with time discount factor , resulting in a total level of utility
In our applications below, we will focus on the special case v (c) = log (c) so as to obtain analytical solutions. Investors obtain the constant endowments e 1 and e 2 in the …rst and second period of their lives. In the …rst period, they choose how much to consume c h t and how much to save in zero coupon bonds at the gross
Rt+1 denotes the amount saved. In the second period of their lives, they obtain the repayment b h t+1 on their bond holdings, consume all their remaining wealth and perish. The optimization problem of generation t investors (in short notation) is
For arbitrary utility functions, the response of b h t+1 to changes in the interest rate is
If b h t+1 > 0, the repayment to investors rises with the market interest rate. Note that the decision problems of di¤erent generations of investors are not directly linked. This greatly simpli…es our analysis -equation (1) de…nes a time-invariant supply of funds function b h (R) that satis…es @b h =@R > 0.
In the case of log-utility, the Euler equation can be solved explicitly for a supply of funds function. We obtain the following expressions for the amount of net savings and bond holdings
Both expressions are increasing in R, i.e. investors save more and receive greater repayments when the interest rate is high. Furthermore, the supply of "hot money" is higher the larger the initial endowment e 1 compared to the secondperiod endowment e 2 . The inverse demand function is
Borrowing Countries
We assume that borrowers in the world economy consist of two symmetric regions of identical atomistic countries of mass 1 each. For simplicity, we call the two regions "North" and "South," denoted by the superscripts N and S respectively. Each country in turn consists of a unit mass of identical atomistic agents who are in…nitely lived. In each country, there is one unit of a Lucas tree with a stochastic payo¤ process that is i.i.d. We denote the payo¤ processes of the trees in the "North" and "South" region as y N t and y S t respectively. We assume that within a given region, the endowment processes are identical across countries, and within a given country they are identical across agents.
Agents value consumption according to the period utility function u (c), which they discount at factor . We denote the variables of a representative borrower in a representative country within region i 2 fN; Sg by the superscript i. They maximize the expectation of their lifetime utility
A representative borrower in region i holds a i t units of the Lucas tree of his country. We assume that the tree can only be owned by local agents in the country, otherwise it becomes worthless. This captures in a simpli…ed manner that real assets cannot be transferred costlessly, because of technological reasons or incentive reasons.
Each period, the representative agent i chooses how much to consume c i t and how much to borrow in world capital markets, denoted by his bond holdings b i t+1 , which will typically be negative to capture borrowing. The agent also chooses the holdings a i t+1 of the tree in his country that he wishes to carry into the next period, where the prevailing market price of the tree is denoted by p i t . The budget constraint of type i agents is
Since the tree can only be held by type i agents, we will …nd that market clearing and symmetry imply that a i t 1 in equilibrium for all agents for all countries in region i.
One of the crucial assumptions about borrowers is that their access to …nance is limited by an incentive problem. We assume that they have an opportunity to move their assets into a fraudulent scam after borrowing in period t, and that international investors can detect this and take legal action, but only if they do so in the period that the fraud is committed. Because of imperfect legal enforcement, international investors can seize at most an amount of the asset holdings of borrowers, which they can re-sell to other agents on the domestic market in country i at the prevailing asset price p i t . This implies that abstaining from fraud is incentive-compatible for domestic agents in country i as long as 4
This requirement imposes a collateral constraint that limits debt to a fraction of the current value of equity holdings of agents in country i. The optimization problem of a representative type i borrower can be expressed as maximizing (3) subject to (4) and (5). Assigning the shadow price i t to the collateral constraint, the …rst-order conditions to the problem are
The second condition iterated forward yields the standard asset pricing equation
The decentralized equilibrium in the economy is a set of allocations and prices that simultaneously solve the optimization problems of international investors and representative borrowers in all countries in the two regions of the world economy, subject to market clearing in international bond markets,
Using this condition allows us to denote the vector of state variables in the economy as s = b N ; b S ; y N ; y S , of which the …rst two are endogenous and the last two are exogenous and i.i.d. By combining the optimality conditions of international investors and representative borrowers in each region, we describe the decentralized equilibrium as recursive functions of the vector of the state variables s for i; j 2 fN; Sg and i 6 = j,
where the last equation captures the evolution of the endogenous state variables. Appendix B describes how to numerically solve for these recursive functions.
Deterministic Equilibrium
To develop some intuition about the workings of the economy, we …rst solve for the equilibrium in a deterministic world economy that satis…es y N t = y S t = y for all agents in all countries and that starts out with common initial bond holdings in the two regions
For notational convenience we drop the superscripts N and S for all region-speci…c variables in this subsection.
Steady State A deterministic steady state in the world economy is characterized by a constant level of bond holdings b = b SS of the representative agents in the two regions and of bonds holdings b h = 2b SS of international investors. Given a steady-state interest rate of R SS , the resulting steady state levels of consumption and of asset prices in all countries are
Unconstrained Steady State If the steady state bond holdings satisfy b SS > p SS = , then the equilibrium in the world economy is strictly unconstrained and the steady-state interest rate satis…es R SS = 1= . This interest rate is consistent with the optimization problem of international investors if the amount borrowed lies on their supply schedule (2), implying
This is the amount of saving that allows international investors to have a smooth consumption pro…le. In such an equilibrium, the intertemporal marginal rates of substitution of international investors and of borrowing countries all equal the market-clearing world interest rate. An unconstrained long-run steady state is indeed feasible if the fundamental parameters of the world economy satisfy Unconstrained Dynamics If this condition is satis…ed, then the world economy will converge to the unconstrained steady-state in the absence of shocks.
Starting from an unconstrained initial debt level of b 0 , we employ the Euler equation of domestic agents in conjunction with the equilibrium interest rate relationship of investors (2) to describe the evolution of the economy as
The phase diagram of a world economy with an unconstrained steady state is depicted in …gure 4. If borrowers start out with less debt than in steady state, i.e. b t > b SS , then the world economy is located to the right of the dashed vertical line in the …gure. Investors reduce the interest rate R t+1 < R SS to entice borrowers to increase their debt. Given the price signal provided by the low interest rate, borrowers …nd that R t+1 < 1 and it is optimal for them to choose a declining consumption path and accumulate more debt, as depicted by the zigzag line in the …gure. Asymptotically, borrowers dissave until the world interest rate satis…es R t+1 = 1. As this situation is reached, all agents (i.e. borrowers as well as international lenders) have a smooth consumption pro…le. The opposite dynamics arise when the initial debt level is more than steady
It is of particular interest for our analysis of the stochastic model below to focus on the behavior of the world interest rate as the economy converges to its steady state: as depicted in the bottom part of …gure 4, the interest rate starts out at a low level when unconstrained representative agents borrow little and gradually increases as debt rises and the world economy converges to its steady state. (10) is not satis…ed, then the deterministic steady-state in the world economy is constrained. In that case, the debt holdings of borrowers are determined by the constraint, i.e. they borrow as much as possible without violating incentive compatibility,
Constrained Steady State If condition
The equilibrium interest rate of investors at that debt level satis…es
< 1, i.e. borrowers in the economy permanently have incentives to dissave, but the constraint prevents them from doing so. This illustrates that binding …nancial constraints depress the world interest rate because they reduce the availability of investment opportunities for international lenders.
We solve the two equations to obtain
Constrained Dynamics Assume that the world economy enters period t with a wealth level of borrowers b t < b con SS . Then borrowing that period is determined by the level of the constraint
However, note that the variable p t in this equation is endogenous. In particular, if b t < b con SS , then borrowing agents have lower wealth than in steady state. Given that they are …nancially constrained, they cannot engage in optimal consumption smoothing. Therefore u 0 (c t ) > u 0 (c t+1 ) and the period t asset price p t declines below its steady-state value. The declining asset price implies that the borrowing limit in equation (11) is reduced further and borrowers are forced to cut back even more on domestic consumption than if the asset price had remained at its fundamental level. The equilibrating process in period t can be viewed as a feedback loop of falling borrowing, falling asset prices and falling consumption, as is typical in models of …nancial ampli…cation. The process is also commonly referred to as "deleveraging." As illustrated in …gure 5, the next-period wealth function b 0 is therefore nonmonotonic. If the equilibrium is characerized by binding constraints, then lower b (i.e. higher debt) implies more severe …nancial ampli…cation e¤ects in the current period and a higher b 0 (i.e. less debt) in the next period. On the other hand, if the equilibrium is unconstrained, then lower b in the current period implies lower b 0 in the next period as the optimal unconstrained consumption path of borrowers implies that they decumulate assets.
The lower panel of the …gure illustrates the e¤ects on the world interest rate: if …nancial constraints are binding, then lower wealth b implies tighter constraints, a lower e¤ective demand for credit from constrained borrowers, and a lower world interest rate. By contrast, if …nancial constraints are loose, then lower wealth b implies greater demand for borrowing and a higher interest rate. The equilibrium world interest rate is therefore a non-monotonic function of the wealth level of borrowers in the world economy.
Comparative Statics
In this subsection, we investigate analytically how individual borrowing countries are a¤ected by changes in some of the model parameters. In order to obtain analytic results, we make several simplifying assumptions. Suppose that the world economy is in its unconstrained steady state so that R SS = 1 for all time periods t 1. In period t = 0, assume that the prevailing world interest rate is given by R 1 . The steady state level of consumption from period 1 onwards is c j SS = y + R SS 1 R SS b j 1 = y + (1 ) b j 1 , i.e. borrowers consume their endowment minus the interest payments on their debt, which keeps their principal constant at b j 1 .
Interest Rates and Unconstrained Borrowing
Let us …rst assume an initial wealth level that is su¢ ciently high so that the economy is unconstrained, i.e. b j 1 R 1 p j 0 . Then the Euler equation of decentralized agents determines borrowing in period 0,
The variable that links the borrowing and lending decisions of all agents in all countries is the world interest rate. Let us therefore analyze the e¤ects of changes in the world interest rate R 1 in our simpli…ed framework:
Lemma 1 If borrowing in period 0 is unconstrained, a lower interest rate R 1 increases the debt level b j 1 carried into the future, as long as the debt level is not too large compared to the degree of relative risk aversion of borrowers.
Applying the implicit function theorem to the Euler equation above yields
The denominator of this equation is always positive, and the numerator is positive as long as b1 R1 u 00 (c0)
borrowing times the degree of relative risk aversion D (c 0 ) is less than consumption. This is always the case in our calibrations below.
Financial Ampli…cation
Next we assume that the initial debt level b j 0 in the economy is so large that the borrowing constraint in period 0 is binding and agents cannot carry their preferred level of debt into the future. A binding …nancial constraint implies that the economy experiences …nancial ampli…cation and deleveraging in period 0.
Analytically, we substitute the binding constraint b j 1 = R 1 p j 0 and write the period 0 budget constraint as c j
Both the left-hand side and the right-hand side of this equation are increasing in p 0 . However, it can easily be seen that the slope of the right-hand side @rhs @p0 is lower than 1 for su¢ ciently low values of ^ , guaranteeing a unique equilibrium in the small open economy. 5 This allows us to …nd the following comparative static result:
Lemma 2 The lower the economy's initial level of liquid net worth b j 0 + y j 0 , the stronger …nancial ampli…cation e¤ ects in country j, i.e. the lower is the local level of asset prices p j 0 , the tigher is the …nancial constraint and the less the economy can borrow. Financial ampli…cation magni…es the impact of changes in liquid net worth on consumption @c j 0 =@b j 0 > 1.
Applying the implicit function theorem to equation (12) and employing the assumption @rhs @p j 0 < 1, it can be readily seen that @p j 0 =@b j 0 > 0 and by implication @c j 0 =@b j 0 > 1, i.e. changes to the initial liquid net worth of borrowers lead to ampli…ed changes in consumption. Since the borrowing limit in period 0 is given by p j 0 , a lower asset price also implies a tighter borrowing limit.
Interest Rates and Financial Ampli…cation
We next investigate how exogenous changes in the world interest rate a¤ect the extent of …nancial ampli…cation if an economy experiences binding constraints:
Lemma 3 The lower the world interest rate R 1 in period 0, the stronger …nancial ampli…cation e¤ ects in country j, i.e. the lower is the local level of asset prices p j 0 , the tigher is the …nancial constraint, the less the economy borrows, and the lower consumption in period 0.
Again, the result can be obtained by applying the implicit function theorem to equation (12) and observing that @p j 0 =@R 1 > 0. A lower world interest rate lowers the asset price in the small open economy j in period 0. Since the borrowing limit in period 0 is given by p j 0 , a lower asset price also implies a tighter borrowing limit and lower period 0 consumption. Furthermore, observe that the welfare e¤ects of higher interest rates are negative since country j is a net borrower.
Discussion
We found in section 3.1 that binding constraints in the world economy lead to lower interest rates. The heuristic result described in lemma 1 of this subsection suggests that these lower interest rates induce countries to take on a higher debt burden, which by lemma 2 makes them more vulnerable to …nancial ampli…cation e¤ects. Furthermore, the …nancial ampli…cation e¤ects will be stronger if world interest rates are low. These e¤ects are the basic building blocks of our argument. In section 5, we will demonstrate these …ndings in a calibrated version of the full model.
Planning Problem
This section analyzes how a constrained planner who internalizes the feedback effects that arise during …nancial ampli…cation can improve welfare in an economy. In general, the decentralized allocations in an economy subject to ampli…cation e¤ects are not constrained e¢ cient, because each borrower i takes the future value of collateral assets in his country as given, even though asset prices are driven by the joint behavior of all agents in the economy. Since the level of asset prices determines the tightness of collateral constraints, a pecuniary externality among borrowers within a given country arises: an individual borrower does not internalize that his borrowing decisions will a¤ect the level of asset prices and by extension the tightness of collateral constraints of other borrowers when ampli…cation e¤ects arise. We will show below that a planner who internalizes this externality can o¤set the distortion by imposing a Pigouvian tax on capital in ‡ows. The contribution of this paper to the literature is to analyze how the level of externalities and the optimal policy response in one country is a¤ected by events in other parts of the world economy, and to study the global general equilibrium e¤ects of macroprudential regulation. 6 Analytically, we describe the behavior of a time-consistent policymaker located in a representative small country in region i of the world economy. Since the country under observation is small, the policymaker in the country takes equilibrium in international …nancial markets and the world interest rate as given. However, in contrast to decentralized agents, the policymaker internalizes the general equilibrium e¤ects of her actions in the domestic economy, including the e¤ects on the level of the asset price p i . We assume that she recognizes that a i 1 in any symmetric equilibrium.
The objective of the planner is then to determine the amount of consumption c i and borrowing b i t+1 of domestic agents so as to maximize welfare in her country, as given by equation (3), subject to the budget constraint (4) and the borrowing constraint (5). The borrowing constraint depends on the level of the asset price in the economy. We assume that the planner does not set the asset price directly, but instead internalizes that her allocations a¤ect the net worth and the marginal utilities of private domestic agents, which in turn determine asset prices through the equilibrium condition (8). One interpretation for this is that private domestic agents are allowed to trade the asset after the planner has determined their consumption and borrowing allocations. A reason why the planner may not want to directly interfere in asset markets is that private agents enjoy an informational advantage in determining asset prices. From equation (7), we …nd that private agents price the asset such that
In a time-consistent equilibrium in period t, the planner in a small country of the world economy observes b i t and y i t and chooses today's consumption c i t and borrowing b i t+1 of domestic agents while taking the equilibrium in world capital markets, as summarized by the vector of state variables s t , and the allocations chosen by the planner in future periods as given. In the equation above, a planner internalizes that her choice of b i t+1 a¤ects the values of c i t+1 and p i t+1 that will be chosen by the time-consistent planner next period. We therefore denote the asset price as a function of the beginning-of-period b i t , the variables c i t and b i t+1 over which the planner has control, and the exogenous state variables that include y i t and all information determining R t+1 as
If the planner chooses to borrow and consume the maximum amount possible given the constraint, then her borrowing would be
This equation de…nes a unique level of b i t+1 for su¢ ciently low ^ , as we had assumed earlier, which in turn results in a unique level of consumption
We denote the level of the asset price that prevails under this allocation as the function p b i t ; s t , which depends only on b i t and s t since the two variables b i t+1 and c i t are set to their maximum level. This function is strictly increasing and continuously di¤erentiable in b i t and re ‡ects the level of the asset price that is relevant for the planner whenever the constraint in the economy is binding. 7 The fact that the function depends only on b i t re ‡ects that the planner has e¤ectively no choice variables left when the constraint is binding -all she can do is to borrow and consume the maximum possible. On the other hand, when the borrowing constraint is loose in a given period, the equilibrium asset price is greater than p b i t ; s t . Therefore the planner therefore recognizes that she can view the borrowing constraint relevant to her problem
The optimization problem of a planner in a representative country i is to maximize (3) subject to the budget constraint (4) and the borrowing constraint (13).
Using the budget constraint to substitute for c i t and assigning the shadow price i t to the borrowing constraint, the planner has a single choice variable b i t+1 . Taking the …rst order condition yields an Euler equation of
Compared to the decentralized Euler equation (6) there is an additional term i t+1 p 0 ( ), which re ‡ects that saving more today increases the asset price by the derivative p 0 ( ) next period. Doing so relaxes the collateral constraint by p 0 ( ) units, which increases utility at rate i t+1 if the constraint is binding. If the economy is in a position where there is no risk of a crisis next period, then E t i t+1 = 0 and the planner's Euler equation coincides with that of decentralized agents. The absence of crisis risk in the following period implies that the planner will not intervene. On the other hand, when the world interest rate is low, e.g. because other parts of the world economy have just su¤ered a crisis, then the incentive to borrow for unconstrained borrowers is particularly strong . Under such circumstances, the tightness of constraints i t+1 in case of a future crisis will be higher and macro-prudential regulations that lean against the wind of capital in ‡ows are particularly desirable.
Implementation
We assume that the policymaker can levy a state-contingent tax t on collateralized borrowing from abroad by residents of the domestic economy and rebate the tax receipts in lump sum fashion. By comparing the Euler equations of decentralized agents (6) and the planner (14), it can be seen that the optimal tax on international borrowing that implements the constrained social optimum satis…es
This expression corresponds to the externality term from equation (14) above, normalized by the marginal utility of current consumption. Since we assumed the domestic economy is small, taxing borrowing does not a¤ect the world interest rate and the allocations of international investors. The tax is fully borne by domestic agents. However, since the tax alleviates an existing ine¢ ciency, it improves welfare.
Naturally, there are a number of equivalent ways in which the policy objective can be achieved. Instead of imposing direct taxes on capital in ‡ows, policymakers frequently impose unremunerated reserve requirements. Speci…cally, market participants who bring money into the domestic economy have to park a fraction of the amount in a reserve account with the central bank that does not accrue interest. The opportunity cost of holding money in an unremunerated account, i.e. the lost interest, can be seen as the equivalent of a tax. The level of such an unremunerated reserve requirement urr would therefore have to be set to
where t+1 represents the expected in ‡ation rate. One limitation to this instrument is the following: if world interest rates and in ‡ation rates are low, the opportunity cost of tying up capital in a reserve account is low, implying that high levels of reserve requirements have to be chosen to impose a tax of a given magnitude. Analytically, this is captured by.the terms in the denominatorfor low R t+1 and t+1 the reserve requirement approaches 100%. Furthermore, when the level of world interest rates is low, small ‡uctuations in interest rates may require large movements in the optimal level of unremunerated reserve requirements. Quantity measures are equivalent to price measures in our simple model, but in practice it is more di¢ cult to calibrate their correct magnitude, and they provide larger incentives for evasion when the quota on in ‡ows is binding. See Korinek (2010) for further discussion.
In practice, policymakers often express concerns not only about rising asset prices but also about appreciating exchange rates when they impose controls on capital in ‡ows. While the model presented in this paper does not explicitly model the exchange rate, a broader interpretation of the mechanism we describe applies. In particular, the exchange rate can be viewed as one of several asset prices in the economy that experiences booms during episodes of in ‡ows and busts when capital ‡ows reverse. In many instances, the reason why policymakers are averse to strong appreciations of the exchange rate is that they are aware that these may be followed by depreciations. Korinek (2007 Korinek ( , 2010 illustrates that exchange rate depreciations may lead to …nancial ampli…cation e¤ects that are similar to those arising from asset price declines in this paper, with similar externalities. In the context of emerging market economies, exchange rate depreciations are of particular concern when borrowers have taken on dollar debts (see also Korinek, 2011a) . 8 5 Quantitative Results
Calibration of Parameters
We calibrate our model at annual frequency since asset price busts typically occur over several quarters. Given this time frame, we choose a value of = 0:96 to correspond to the typical annual discount rate in the literature. The coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion of borrowing agents is taken as = 2. For international investors, we maintain a log-utility function.
Under the parameter values chosen so far, the steady-state asset price to output ratio of borrowers is p SS = 24. We set the parameter in the borrowing constraint to = :015 to target a steady-state external debt to output ratio of b SS = :36, which corresponds to the average external indebtedness of the countries included in the World Bank's Global Development Finance database.
We assume that the output process in both regions of the world economy is i.i.d. and follows a binominal distribution y i t 2 fy H ; y L g, where y H and y L capture booms and busts, with busts occuring with a probability of = :03, i.e. on average three times a century, re ‡ecting the incidence of crises over the past century. We normalize y H = 1 and calibrate y L = :94 so as to match the average decline in detrended output in G-7 countries during the most recent crises. 9 We calibrate the parameters of international investors such that there is a small shortage of investment opportunities in steady-state. In a marginally unconstrained deterministic steady state, total savings of international investors would be b h SS = 2b SS = 2 p SS . They would enjoy a smooth consumption pro…le with c h t = c and the world interest rate would satisfy R t+1 = 1 if their endowments were e 1 = c + b SS and e 2 = c b SS with = 2. However, given the precautionary motive of borrowers, their credit demand in the stochastic equilibrium is less than p SS . We therefore set = 1:9 so that borrowers are marginally unconstrained in steady state. The parameter c determines the elasticity of the interest rate with respect to credit demand. We set c = 3 to target a decline in the interest rate to zero if one of the two regions experiences a bust.
The parameter values are summarized in table 2. disproportionately on exporters, who may have disproportionate lobbying power. 9 An alternative approach would be to approximate the output process fytg by a discrete random variable with a larger number of states so as to resemble a continuous random variable. This would allow us to endogenize the thresholdŷt of the endowment shock below which the economy experiences binding constraints and crises, and to make statements about this threshold. However, this would come at the expense of clarity in our analysis. Furthermore, given that …nancial crises are rare events, it is di¢ cult to calibrate the precise probability distribution of the left tail of the process fytg. More generally, all of our results below that relate to the intensive margin of …nancial crises given yt = y L (i.e. how severe they will be) apply equally to the extensive margin, as captured by the probability of a crisis and the thresholdŷt. Figure 6 depicts the policy functions for b 0 , p and c of a representative borrower in region i as a function of his liquid net wealth m = y i + b i , while keeping the level of liquid net wealth of the other region j at its steady state value. All three policy functions exhibit a kink when the region switches from the constrained to the unconstrained region, which occurs at m = 0:62. To the left of this threshold, consumption and the asset price respond considerably more to changes in m than to the right of the threshold, since borrowing constraints are binding and the economy experiences …nancial ampli…cation. The policy function b 0 is declining for constrained values of m since greater liquid net wealth implies a higher asset price and a higher borrowing limit. For unconstrained values of m, the policy function b 0 is increasing as the agent optimally smoothes consumption and carries more wealth into the future the more liquid wealth he possesses. The dashed vertical line indicates the level of net wealth that is reached if the economy has been in the boom state for a long number of periods. For simplicity, we call this wealth level the high steady state.
Simulation Results
The bottom panel of the …gure shows the world interest rate R 0 as a function of liquid net wealth m, while keeping the liquid net worth in the other region at its steady state level. The interest rate is a mirror image of the policy function b 0 -the more the agent borrows, the higher the interest rate that international investors demand.
When a region is in its high steady state and experiences a bust shock y t = y L , it deleverages, i.e. its debt goes down (bond holdings increase). In our benchmark calibration, the economy's debt level declines by 7% of GDP, which equals the magnitude of the economy's current account reversal. Domestic absorption falls by 12%, and the domestic asset price collapses by 23%. Following a number of positive shocks y H , the economy slowly returns to the steady state debt level b SS .
In …gure 7 we depict a sample simulation of the world economy with two regions. The …rst panel shows output and consumption in the North, and the second panel depicts the two variables in the South. In the given simulation, there are three instances of busts. The North experiences a single bust in period 18, whereas the South experiences busts in periods 4 and 20. In each such episode, consumption declines more strongly than output because falling asset prices and falling borrowing capacity reinforce the e¤ects of the initial output shock.
The …gure also illustrates the spillover e¤ects of …nancial crises in one region to the other region: if the South experiences a bust in period 4 (panel 2), it becomes …nancially constrained and is forced to reduce its debt level. Given the lower e¤ective world demand for capital, the world interest rate declines (panel 3). 10 This induces higher capital ‡ows to the North, which temporarily borrows and consumes more (panel 1). If the North continues to experience positive output shocks, both countries in the world economy converge back to the high steady state.
However, if a region is hit by a negative output shock after its debt level has just gone up, then it is more vulnerable to …nancial crises and experiences more severe ampli…cation e¤ects. This is the situation of the South in period 20. In our simulation, the North su¤ers a …nancial crisis in period 18, and in response to the …nancial constraints in the North, world interest rates decline and hot money ‡ows to the South, which takes advantage of the cheap credit by increasing its level of indebtedness. In period 20, the South su¤ers an adverse shock and experiences a crisis that is signi…cantly larger than the one in period 4 -absorption declines by 13.7% instead of 12%. Figure 8 shows the impact of an adverse output shock y L on the level of debt (panel 1) as well as on consumption (panel 2) t periods after a …nancial crisis in the other region. The decline in borrowing b can be interpreted as the extent of deleveraging in the economy and will materialize in the form of a current account reversal. The baseline -an adverse shock without a preceding crisis in the other region -is depicted for t < 0 and consists of a 7.3% decline in borrowing capacity and a 12% decline in consumption. If the shock hits in the aftermath of crises in other parts of the world economy, the decline in borrowing capacity is up to 9%, and the decline in consumption up to 14.6%.
Policy Measures
Given the risk of …nancial ampli…cation e¤ects and the associated externalities, policymakers in the described economies …nd it optimal to impose Pigouvian taxes on foreign borrowing in good times so as to mitigate the crises that occur in response to adverse shocks.
In our benchmark calibration, a planner …nds it optimal to impose a tax on foreign borrowing in the amount of 1.89% in the high steady state. For example, if a borrower took on $100 in foreign credit, the planner would impose a Pigouvian tax of $1.89 per year. According to equation (15), in an economy with 2% in ‡ation, the same e¤ect could be achieved by imposing an unremunerated reserve requirement in the amount of 35%, i.e. if a borrower took on $100 in foreign credit, he would be required to hold $35 of that amount in an unremunerated reserve account. These magnitudes of in ‡ow taxation or unremunerated reserve requirements are within the range of policy measures that have recently been enacted by a number of emerging economies. 11 If a …nancial crises occurs somewhere else in the world economy, it is desirable to raise the tax to lean against the resulting ‡ows of hot money. The top panel of …gure 9 depicts the optimal macroprudential tax t periods after a crisis has occurred in the other region of the world economy. In the period the crisis occurs, the optimal level of the tax is 1.97%, and the corresponding reserve requirement would be 53%. Over the ensuing periods, it falls progressively back to the steady state level.
Panels 2 and 3 of the …gure replicate the results of …gure 8 given the optimal level of macroprudential taxation. The …gures show the impact of an adverse shock in one region t periods after an adverse shock has occurred in the other region. The dashed line represents the impact in the decentralized equilibrium and the solid line under a planner's optimal intervention. The tax on foreign borrowing mitigates the e¤ects of an adverse shock on consumption from 12% to 8.8% in the high steady state of the world economy. When the country has experienced in ‡ows of hot money in the aftermath of a crisis in another region, the tax reduces the impact of an adverse shock on consumption from 13.7% to 10%. Similarly, optimal taxation reduces the current account reversal from 7.3% to 3.4% in the high steady state of the world economy, and from 9% to 4.4% when a country has experienced in ‡ows of hot money in the aftermath of a …nancial crisis somewhere else.
We simulated the evolution of the world economy and the optimal macroprudential tax over a period of 200 time periods and depict the relationship between the optimal tax on the level of debt in a given region in …gure 10. It can be seen that there is a very close relationship between the two variables that is almost linear. Regressing the optimal tax rate on a constant and the economy's level of debt yields that It is also interesting to observe the e¤ects of optimal capital ‡ow taxation on the level of world interest rates. In the decentralized equilibrium without intervention, the world interest rate is 3.3% in the high steady state. If one region experiences a …nancial crisis, the resulting current account reversal pushes down the world real interest rate to -.5%. On the other hand, when all countries impose the optimal level of macroprudential regulation, the world real interest rate is 1.6% in steady state, and it declines to only -.2% in the event of a crisis.
In welfare terms, we …nd that optimal capital in ‡ow taxation increases a country's welfare in our model by the equivalent of a permanent increase in consumption by .4%, which is higher than most estimates of the welfare cost of business cycles.
Conclusions
This paper has developed a simple model of hot money and serial …nancial crises. Money is "hot"in the sense that countries that borrow and later su¤er adverse shocks become subject to …nancial ampli…cation e¤ects that lead to a coordinated decline in consumption, borrowing, and asset prices. Individual market participants do not internalize that they expose their country to such ampli…cation e¤ects when they make their privately optimal borrowing decisions. As a result, they create an externality on other borrowers. A policymaker can induce market participants to internalize these e¤ects by imposing macroprudential policies such as prudential controls on capital in ‡ows. Such measures reduce macroeconomic volatility and improve welfare in the domestic economy.
The main focus of the paper was to show that crises in one region of the world economy lead to higher ‡ows of hot money to other regions, which become in turn more vulnerable to future …nancial crises. For example, we showed that an adverse shock of a given size that normally leads to a 12% decline in domestic absorption will cause a 14.6% decline in domestic absorption if a country has just experienced in ‡ows of hot money. By imposing a macroprudential tax on capital in ‡ows of close to 2%, these magnitudes can be reduced to 8.8% and 10% respectively.
The admissibility of capital controls as a tool of macroeconomic management has recently been endorsed by researchers at the IMF (see e.g. Ostry et al., 2010 Ostry et al., , 2011 , who propose that controls on capital in ‡ows may indeed be desirable for countries who experience overvalued exchange rates and who have su¢ cent reserves and adequate …scal and monetary policy. Our paper highlights one particular mechanism that provides a welfare rationale for such controls. We …nd that capital controls may also be desirable in case a country experiences asset price booms that are fuelled by capital in ‡ows, not only in case of appreciations in the exchange rate, since the reversal of the credit ‡ows that led to booms in asset prices may trigger …nancial ampli…cation e¤ects in which declining asset prices entail pecuniary externalities. 12 The empirical literature, as summarized e.g. by Magud et al. (2011) , …nds that capital controls are generally e¤ective in altering the composition of in ‡ows, to some extent e¤ective in reducing exchange rate pressures, but not necessarily e¤ective in curbing the total volume of in ‡ows. If the composition of in ‡ows is successfully altered in favor of contingent …nancial instruments such as FDI or local currency debt, the externalities discussed in this paper will be reduced and the vulnerability to crisis will be diminished, as shown e.g. in Korinek (2009 Korinek ( , 2010 . In general, empirically identifying the e¤ects of capital controls on the volume of in ‡ows is di¢ cult because of endogeneity problems -controls are most likely to be imposed when capital in ‡ows are large, but this does not imply that capital controls cause larger in ‡ows. Forbes (2005) argues that capital controls may be undesirable since they increase the cost of …nance. However, increasing the cost of borrowing from abroad so as to raise the private cost to the social cost is precisely the goal of such controls -the higher prices provide a market signal to borrowers to reduce the activity that imposes negative externalities on the rest of their economy.
There are a number of directions in which our research could be extended. One set of issues that deserves further analysis are the links between …nancial stability and growth. We analyzed the problem of hot money and serial …nancial crises in a model of an endowment economy, but our …ndings are likely to be very relevant for production economies. In such economies, private market participants expand the stock of capital during booms and the price of capital rises, enabling them to take on more credit. During busts, the stock of capital becomes less valuable and the collateral value declines. This may lead to a feedback spiral of declining borrowing capacity, falling asset prices, and …re sales. A policymaker who leans against the wind when credit ‡ows into the economy may reduce excessive capital creation in booms, which mitigates the need for …re sales and the decline in asset prices plus the associated credit crunch in case of a bust, thereby increasing social welfare.
The problem is even further aggravated if investment has long-term e¤ects on economic growth. Recent evidence (see e.g. IMF, 2009) suggests that credit crunches may have long-lasting detrimental e¤ects on output because the investment lost during the crunch cannot be fully made up for during the ensuing recovery. Under such circumstances the welfare costs of …nancial crises are sig-ni…cantly greater than what we found in our numerical results because they stretch over many periods. See Jeanne and Korinek (2011a) for an investigation along these lines.
A Data Sources
The stylized facts reported in the introductory part of the paper are based on four sets of variables that we obtained at annual frequency for 176 countries over the period of 1980-2009: As an indicator for the world interest rate, we use 10-year US Treasury bond yields de ‡ated by the US consumer price index, which is smoothed by taking a three year moving average so as to remove sudden unexpected changes in in ‡ation. Both variables are taken from the IMF's International Financial Statistics (IFS) database.
The dummy variable for capital ‡ow bonanzas is calculated using IFS data according to the procedure of Reinhart and Reinhart (2008) , i.e. a bonanza occurs when a country's current account balance as a percentage of GDP is in its top quintile. Dummy variable for banking crises are obtained from Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2009) , Table A .3.1170. Dummy variables for currency crises are calculated using IFS data according to the procedure of Frankel and Rose (1996) , i.e. a currency crisis occurs if a country's exchange rate depreciates by more than 25%, and if this depreciation in turns is at least 10% more than in the preceding period. Finally dummies for all crises are constucted by combining banking and currency crisis dummies.
The Granger causality tests in table 1 were performed using …xed e¤ects panel regressions. We …rst included lags of the dependent variable and found that the only the …rst lag was signi…cant. Then we augmented the regression with lagged values of the independent variable. In table 1 we report the resulting parameters and the associated t-values in parentheses. In both tests that are reported we can reject the hypothesis that the independet variables does not Granger-cause the dependent variable at the .1% level.
We also investigated a potential causal link between US banking crises and US 10-year bond yields by constructing an indicator of US bank failures from the FDIC list of failed banks as a proxy for banking sector problems in the US. However, we could not establish Granger-causality since FDIC assistance seemed to occur with a signi…cant lag to the actual occurance of banking sector problems.
B Numerical Solution Method
Our numerical solution method is an extension of the endogenous gridpoint bifurcation method of Jeanne and Korinek (2010) . Denote the beginning of period bond holdings for a representative agent in region i as b and for an agent in region j as d. The interest rate is a function of aggregate worldwide borrowing R = R (b + d) as given by (2). Denote the total beginning of period liquid wealth holdings of agents in the two regions as m = b + y and n = d + z. Our problem is to obtain policy functions c (m; n), p (m; n), (m; n) and b 0 (m; n). By symmetry this latter function is identical to d 0 (n; m).
Taking advantage of the e¢ ciency gains provided by the endogenous gridpoint bifurcation method requires setting up the problem in two nested loops.
B.1 Outer Loop
At the beginning of iteration k in the outer loop, we start with the policy functions c k (m; n), p k (m; n), k (m; n) and b 0 k (m; n), which is symmetric to d 0 k (m; n). (The initial policy functions can be set arbitrarily.)
B.2 Inner Loop
Each inner loop iteration starts with a given set of policy functionsc l (m; d 0 ), p l (m; d 0 ) and~ l (m; d 0 ). (The initial functions can be set arbitrarily.) Taking d 0 k (m; n) from the outer loop as given, we calculateĉ (m; n) =c l (m; d 0 k (m; n)) and similarly forp and^ . In order to take advantage of the endogenous gridpoints method, it is useful to perform our iterations over the grid (b 0 ; d 0 ) of end-of-period wealth levels. For any pair (b 0 ; d 0 ), we calculate the world interest rate R (b 0 ; d 0 ) = R (b 0 + d 0 ), which is obtained from lenders'optimality condition (2). Then we de…ne
Then we solve the system of optimality conditions …rst under the assumption that the borrowing constraint is loose. In the same way, we can solve for the constrained branch of the system for b 0 0 under the assumption that the borrowing constraint is binding in the current period as
:
Concatenating constrained and unconstrained results as in Jeanne and Korinek (2010) allows us to obtain policy functionsc l+1 (m; d 0 ),p l+1 (m; d 0 ) and ~ l+1 (m; d 0 ) as well asw 0 l+1 (m; d 0 ). The steps are iterated until convergence is reached. By employing the endogenous gridpoint bifurcation method, this loop converges very quickly.
Once the inner loop is completed, we observe that the two functionsb 0 l+1 (m; d 0 ) and the symmetricd 0 l+1 (n; b 0 ) can be combined to b 0 =b 0 l+1 m;d 0 l+1 (n; b 0 )
Finding the root of this equation yields a function b 0 k+1 (m; n) and the symmetric function d 0 k+1 (n; m). This step is computationally more costly. However, by alternating iterating on the (e¢ cient) inner loop with iterating on the (computationally costly) outer loop, the problem can be solved in an e¢ cient manner. We substitute d 0 k+1 (m; n) intoc l (m; d 0 ),p l (m; d 0 ) and~ l (m; d 0 ) to obtain c k+1 (m; n), p k+1 (m; n), k+1 (m; n) and iterate until convergence.
